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GOD, POSSIBILITY, AND KANT 
Robert Merrihew Adams 
In one of his precritical works, Kant defends, as "the only possible" way of 
demonstrating the existence of God, an argument from the nature of possi-
bility. Whereas Leibniz had argued that possibilities must be thought by 
God in order to obtain the ontological standing that they need, Kant argued 
that at least the most fundamental possibilities must be exemplified in God. 
Here Kant's argument is critically examined in comparison with its 
Leibnizian predecessor, and it is suggested that an argument combining the 
strengths of both of them has much to be said for it 
It is not as widely recognized as it should be that much of the discussion of 
arguments for the existence of God in Kant's Critiqul' of Pure Reasoll, includ-
ing much of the criticism of the "ontological" and "physico-theological" 
arguments, is drawn from an earlier work of Kant's, The Only Possible 
Argument ill Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God,' in which he 
endorsed a metaphysical argument for theism-a different argument. That 
"precritical" argument is not successful as it stands, but I think it will still 
repay philosophical attention. It is the main subject of the present paper. 
I. Strategies of Theistic Argument 
Kant's precritical strategy of theistic proof is based on an idea that 
remained important to him: the idea of God as an ens realissimum, a most 
real being, possessing attributes or perfections that are archetypes of the 
less perfect attributes of finite things. His proof belongs to the same his-
toric family as the fourth of St. Thomas Aquinas's famous "Five Ways" of 
proving the existence of God, which "is taken," as Aquinas says, "from the 
degrees that are found in things." Since "there is found in things some-
thing more and less good and true and noble," Thomas claims that there 
must be, as a standard of comparison, "something that is truest and best 
and noblest, and consequently is maximally a being; for those things that 
are maximally true are maximally beings."2 How do finite things depend 
on the divine archetype? Aquinas conceives of the dependence as causal. 
The Fourth Way concludes as follows: 
But what is called maximally such in any kind is the cause of all that 
are of that kind, as fire, which is maximally hot, is the cause of all hot 
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things [being hotl ... Therefore there is something that is the cause 
of being to all beings, and of goodness and of whatever perfection; 
and this we call God? 
This way of arguing is based on the idea, prominent in both Aristotelian 
and Platonic traditions, that like is caused by like. In some cases, at least, 
as in the Aristotelian example of fire causing heat, this idea appeals to com-
mon sense. Things that are very hot seem to cause heat in other things, 
though generally not as high a degree of heat as they themselves possessed 
to begin with. Similarly, the reasoning goes, it is by possessing the maxi-
mal degree of every perfection that God can cause the more limited perfec-
tions of other things. 
This view of the causal dependence of finite perfections on the divine per-
fection has not altogether vanished from Kant's thought,' but he did not 
emphasize it as a basis of theistic argument. This reflects the declining pres-
tige of the like-causes-like principle in modern philosophy. In the "only pos-
sible argument" to support a metaphysical proof of theism in Kant's precriti-
cal period, it is the possibility rather than the actual existence of the qualities 
of finite things that is explained by the corresponding perfections in the 
divine nature, and the argument is not in the ordinary sense a causal one. 
Though not causal, Kant's argument is still explanatory, justifying the-
ism on the basis of an explanation it makes possible. It is very important to 
metaphysics that not all explanations are causal, and metaphysical theories 
can be justified by the value of their noncausal explanations. In many 
metaphysical theories what is explained is not the causation but the consti-
tution of certain facts. Kant saw the only possible basis for theistic proof in 
an explanation of what facts about possibility can consist in, given that 
they are commonly facts about things that do not exist. 
Among arguments for the existence of God, those based on theistic 
explanations of the nature of possibility are not as well known as they 
deserve to be, but Kant was presumably familiar with the one found in 
Leibniz's Monadology: 
In God is not only the source of existences, but also that of essences, 
insofar as they are real, or of what is real in possibility. That's 
because the Understanding of God is the region of eternal truths, or 
of the ideas on which they depend, and because without him there 
would be nothing real in the possibilities, and not only nothing exist-
ing, but also nothing possible.' 
Leibniz believed, as many philosophers do today, that there are neces-
sary truths about possibilities that are not actual, which could and would 
have been true even if no contingent beings (such as we are) ever existed. 
Leibniz also held that all truths must be ontologically grounded in facts 
about concrete existing particulars. But facts that would still obtain if no 
contingent beings ever existed cannot depend on contingent beings for 
their ontological grounding; for instance, they cannot depend on thoughts 
in merely human minds. Leibniz concluded that some substance must 
exist necessarily that could ground the eternal truths in the possible case in 
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which no contingent beings would have existed. So "if there is a reality in 
the Essences or possibilities, or indeed in the eternal truths, that reality 
must be founded in something existing and Actual; and consequently in 
the Existence of the necessary Being."i 
Leibniz held that the only possible ontological basis for the whole sys-
tem of necessary truths about possibilities would be in the mind of a being 
that understood all of them in all their relations with each other. We may 
call such a being modally omniscient. Leibniz inferred that there must neces-
sarily exist a modally omniscient being to think all the eternal truths and 
the ideas that ground them. Elsewhere I have discussed in some detail 
Leibniz's reasons for thinking that a single individually necessary and 
modally omniscient being would be required to ground the reality of pos-
sibilities, and that this metaphysical task cannot be parceled out among a 
plurality of individually less impressive beings.? 
In the present paper I will discuss those reasons much more briefly, and 
not until after we have examined Kant's argument. For the present, suffice 
it to say that on these points I find Leibniz's reasons persuasive, though not 
indisputably conclusive. 
The most striking difference between this Leibnizian argument and the 
argument of Kant's Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of 
the Existence of God is that what Leibniz's argument requires God to do to 
ground the possibilities and the eternal truths is to think them, whereas 
Kant's argument requires Cod to exemplify possibilities-not all possibilities, 
but the most fundamental qualitative possibilities. Kant's argument is that 
in order for possibilities to have their "material" content, the primitive posi-
tive qualities involved in that content must actually be possessed by some 
being; he is emphatic that actual existence of something possessing them is 
required. Not that all qualities that could possibly be exemplified must be 
actually exemplified. It is enough if the most fundamental qualities are 
exemplified; the other possible qualities can be constructed from them. 
Kant held that any hypothesis that would take away the material of possi-
bility thereby renders itself impossible, and concluded that the most funda-
mental positive qualities are necessarily exemplified. 
The role this argument assigns to Cod is that of necessarily existing and 
necessarily exemplifying the most primitive and purely positive qualities; 
it is the role of an ens realissimum. Leibniz had believed that Cod does nec-
essarily possess those qualities, and that all qualities of finite beings are 
constructed from the divine qualities, mainly by limitation. To my knowl-
edge, however, Leibniz did not use this thesis to argue as Kant did for the 
necessary existence of Cod as a ground of possibilities, using instead, for 
that purpose, a thesis about God's thinking all the possibilities. 
I can now state the central question of the present paper: Was the pre-
critical Kant right in holding that the ontological grounding of possibility 
requires actual exemplification of the most fundamental qualitative possibil-
ties? Or would it be enough for these (and other possibilities to be thought 
by a modally omniscient being? I think there is something important to be 
said for the requirement of actual exemplification, but it will take some 
work to develop the argument for it. 
428 Faith and Philosophy 
n. The Critical alld the Precritical 
Some may wonder whether it is worth spending time and energy on 
Kant's early, precritical argument for theism, given that Kant himself, in 
his later, critical period, famously rejected all theoretical proofs of theism, 
presumably including his own earlier proof. Why should we bother with a 
proof whose author later found a fallacy in it? In fact it is hard to find spe-
cific criticisms of Kant's own earlier theistic proof in his critical works. 
Three theistic arguments are subjected to withering criticism in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. Kant's own argument is not one of them; this should not 
surprise us, since some of these criticisms of metaphysical arguments for 
theism are borrowed from his earlier work, in which they justified prefer-
ring his "only possible argument" for theism to the others. 
Kant has a bit to say about his earlier proof in the Critique of Pure Reason, 
chiefly in the course of explaining why the idea of an ens realissimum is an 
inescapable idea of reason. The idea of such a being is necessary, he still 
thinks, to explain the matter of possibility. However, he does now say that 
for this purpose "reason does not presuppose the existence of a being con-
forming to the ideal, but only the idea of such a being."~ Does this mean he 
has changed his mind and now thinks that the most basic realities need not 
be exemplified, but only thought in an "idea"? I think not. 
The "idea" of which Kant speaks in this passage of the Critique is not God's 
actual thinking of all the matter of possibility, but only our own rather formal 
and abstract idea of an ens realissimum. We should not misread Kant's funda-
mentally epistemological claim in the Critique as a metaphysical claim about 
the grounds of possibility. We may get a fuller view of Kant's "critical" atti-
tude toward his earlier "only possible argument" for theism from his Lectures 
on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, dating from shortly after the publication 
of his first Critique. Here it is clear that Kant is certainly not prepared to reject 
as false the claim that God must exemplify the most basic realities in order to 
ground their possibility. That claim is still embraced, but subject to an episte-
mological reservation. In the Lectures Kant says that 
we have no concept of real possibility except through existence, and 
in the case of every possibility which we think realiter we always pre-
suppose some existence; if not the actuality of the thing itself, then at 
least an actuality in general which contains the data for everything 
possible.9 
This may look like Kant's precritical position, but it is not a full-blooded 
metaphysical affirmation; it is about our concepts of things rather than 
about the things themselves. Similarly Kant says in the Lectures, about his 
earlier argument, that "even this proof is not apodictically certain; for it 
cannot establish the objective necessity of an original being, but establishes 
only the subjective necessity of assuming such a being."]() That is the extent 
to which his precritical theistic argument is repudiated in Kant's critical 
philosophy: it shows that we must (subjectively) think of things as related 
to an ens realissimum, but does not prove (at least not apodictically) that 
such a being exists in objective fact. 
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We see here the extreme demandingness of the epistemological stan-
dards that Kant's critical philosophy would impose on metaphysical rea-
soning. If we cannot conceive of anything being possible except in relation 
to something existent, and we are sure that some things are possible, that 
would seem to me a good reason for believing in the relevant existence. I 
grant that this reason yields no apodictic proof, for it could be that that there 
is some other true ground of possibility but we have been unable to con-
ceive of it. But I do not see how we can proceed in philosophy without 
allowing our beliefs to be guided by the only ways in which we can con-
ceive of things that we believe being true. I don't think that Kant in fact 
manages to avoid relying on such reasons in his critical philosophy; per-
haps he is able for the most part to confine his reliance on them to his rea-
soning about the structure and necessary conditions internal to our own 
experience, but it is not clear to me that such reasoning should be trusted 
even there if it is not trustworthy about things in general. In any event, 
Kant's epistemological standards are not mine. In relation to the epistemo-
logical standards that I think appropriate for forming metaphysical beliefs, 
I would have to say that the mature Kant still thought very well of his ear-
lier basis for theistic proof. It does not follow, of course, that I should think 
his argument a good one. So let us examine it in some detail. 
III. Form and Matter of Possibility 
The argument begins with a distinction of great interest: 
A triangle that has a right angle is possible in itself. The triangle as 
well as the right angle are the data or the material in this possible; 
whereas the agreement of the one with the other according to the 
principle of contradiction is the formal [constituent] of the possibility. 
I shall also call this latter the logical in the possibility, because the 
comparison of the predicates with their subjects according to the rule 
of truth is nothing but a logical relation. The something, or what 
stands in this agreement, will sometimes be called the real [con-
stituent] of the possibility.lI 
This distinction between a formal or logical constituent and a material or 
real constituent of possibility remained important to Kant throughout his 
career. It is close kin to the first Critique's distinction between logical and 
real possibility. 
Distinctions between the formal and the material are subtle and can be 
contextually relative. Shape is matter for the logical form of consistency, 
but is itself, I would argue, a geometrical form that requires matter of its 
own. Kant's concern in this context, in any event, is with logical form. The 
following example of logical form may help us to understand the relation 
between form and matter, and the need for material content. 'For some x, 
Fx and Gx' and 'For some x, Kx and Lx' have the same logical form. 
Moreover, if the predicate letters are merely schematic, the one formula 
does not express or mean anything different from the other. They have, in 
that case, no material, but only formal, content. 
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One is tempted to add that they express no proposition at all-if the 
predicate letters are merely schematic. This would be a bold illustration of 
the point that form without content is empty. Perhaps it is too bold, how-
ever. For one could treat both formulas as equivalent to the second order 
formula 'For some x and for some F and G, Fx and Gx,' which is just as for-
mal and empty of material content, but can be taken as expressing a propo-
sition-the proposition, namely, that there is something that has a predi-
cate and has a predicate (that mayor may not be different from the first 
one). In terms of Kant's later "critical" philosophy, this is a proposition 
employing the pure, nonempirical category of subsistence and inherence. 
It is a formally consistent, "logically possible," proposition of the sort that 
Kant allows we can think even about empirically inaccessible things in 
themselves. But it does not express what Kant calls a "real possibility" 
unless some material content is possible for the predicates. His "only pos-
sible argument" is concerned with real possibility. 
The distinction between formal and material constituents of possibility 
is important to that argument for at least two reasons. The first is that it is 
specifically, and I think only, with respect to the material constituents of 
possibility that Kant argues that they would be lacking if the most funda-
mental of them were not exemplified an existent being, and in fact in God. 
Or perhaps the point is that to consider any constituent of possibility with 
regard to its ontological grounding is to consider it as material for possibili-
ty, so that even the question whether there is any such property at all as 
consistency, as opposed to the question whether this proposition is consis-
tent rather than inconsistent, is about the material rather than the formal 
requirements of possibility. In any event I think Kant's argument can be 
made more vividly plausible for the most unequivocally material or quali-
tative constituents. 
The second reason for the importance of the distinction in Kant's argu-
ment is that it structures his account of how there can be a necessary being, 
a being that exists necessarily. A necessary being is one whose nonexis-
tence is impossible; and impossibility of nonexistence, Kant thought, could 
not be grounded in the formal requirements of possibility. The most 
important formal requirement of possibility (in fact the only one Kant men-
tions as such) is logical consistency. And he believed that all hypotheses of 
nonexistence pass the test of merely logical consistency. He defends this 
belief in The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the 
Existence of God on the same grounds as in the Critique of Pure Reason." 
Hypotheses of nonexistence may still fail to satisfy material requirements 
of possibility, however. "Possibility falls away, not only if an inner contra-
diction is to be met with, as the logical [constituent] of impossibility, but 
also if no material, no datum, is there to be thought." Suppose there is 
something on whose actual existence the material for all possibility 
depends, as Kant argues is the case. Then "all possibility falls away entire-
ly" if that being fails to exist. Kant claims that it follows that the nonexis-
tence of that being is impossible, for "that through which all possibility 
altogether is annulled is absolutely impossible."13 
For the moment I am interested in this, not as an argument for the exis-
tence of such a being, but as an explanation of how the nonexistence of a 
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being could be absolutely impossible even if it is not logically inconsistent. 
Early and late Kant held that nonexistence is never logically inconsistent, 
and appealed to this point in criticizing the ontological argument for the-
ism. Some have taken his arguments on these points as showing that the 
nonexistence of a being cannot be absolutely (or metaphysically) impossi-
ble, and a narrow focus on certain texts14 might lead us to suppose that was 
Kant's conclusion too. In a larger view that interpretation is hard to sus-
tain, however. Even in his critical period he professed belief in God, on 
practical grounds, and thought of God as a necessary being. '5 
And he still accepted, in a way, his earlier explanation of how God's 
existence could be necessary. In his lectures on philosophical theology in 
the 17RO's he held that we have a "rational concept of real necessity ... 
where a thing is eo ipso necessary if its nonexistence would remove all pos-
sibility." He went on to say that on this basis "only the subjective necessity 
of such a being is ... established, i.e. that our speculative reason sees itself 
necessitated to presuppose this being if it wants to have insight into why 
something is possible, but the objective necessity of such a being can by no 
means be demonstrated in this matter."16 But I take "demonstrated" 
(demonstriret) to be the key word in this qualification, and "objective" to 
have an epistemological rather than metaphysical sense; for Kant's earlier 
account here is presented in a manner that seems to indicate that he still 
thought that so far as we can see, the existence of God might be metaphysi-
cally necessary in this way. 
IV. Kant's Argument alld Leibniz's 
It will be difficult to take this explanation seriously if we haven't at least an 
idea of how the nonexistence of God, or of some other being, might remove 
all possibility. In relation to Kant's account of the matter, we want some 
reason why the ontological grounding of possibility would require actual 
exemplification of the most fundamental qualitative possibilties. Kant's 
argument is not maximally helpful on this point. He begins by arguing that 
lithe internal possibility of all things presupposes some existence or other./I 
This might be grounded, as Leibniz would ground it, by appealing to the 
principle that all facts, even about possibility, must be grounded in existing 
things; but Kant does not make this appeal. Instead he reasons: lito say 
'There exists nothing' means the same as 'There is nothing at all'; and it is 
obviously self-contradictory to add, in spite of this, that there is something 
possible."'? This reasoning already tends toward the conclusion that what-
ever is possible must in some way be something that actually exists, but it 
also seems to be a verbal trick. It rests on the assumption, embraced by 
many philosophers today, that 'there is' always implies existence; but why 
should a philosopher who accepts that assumption express possibility 
claims in the form 'There is something possible' rather than in the form 'It is 
possible that ... ', which seems more neutral ontologically? 
Kant's reason for his view is somewhat better articulated when he 
comes to defend the more specific thesis that "all possibility is given in 
something actual, either in it as a determination or through it as a conse-
quence./I" He thinks that the most fundamental qualitative possibilities 
432 Faith alld PhilosopllY 
must be given as "determinations" -that is, properties---of something exis-
tent; but other possibilities can be given as "consequences" of the more 
fundamental ones.19 Kant's motive for allowing the second alternative is 
that he does not want to be committed to ascribing all possible qualitative 
properties to God, because he thinks some of them are dynamically if not 
logically incompatible with each other.20 But he insists that the most funda-
mental "material" of possibility must actually exist, or must be given as a 
"determination" or property of something actually existing. 
Kant's example of a fundamental property in making his argument at 
this juncture is extension:21 
Given that you cannot analyze the concept of extension any further 
into simpler data ... as you must necessarily come anyway in the end 
to something whose possibility cannot be analyzed, then the question 
here is whether space and extension are empty words or whether 
they denote [bezeichnellJ something. ... If space does not exist, or is 
not at least given as a consequence through something existing, then 
the word 'space' means [bedeutet] nothing at all?2 
Here Kant seems to be assuming that in order to be meaningful, or at least 
in order to have material content, a concept must either denote something 
existing or else result in some way from existing things. But why should we 
assume that? Why can't concepts have meaning, and material content, by 
representing possible things that do not exist at all? That is the central ques-
tion before us, and Kant offers here no noncircular argument to settle it. 
We have uncovered thus far no reason to prefer Kant's argument, or 
Kant's way of grounding possibilities in God, to Leibniz's. Neither will we 
find any in the next phase of Kant's argument. It is not enough, for Kant's 
purposes, to argue that the most fundamental qualitative or "material" pos-
sibilities must be grounded in existing things as "determinations" or prop-
erties of those things. He must argue further that they must all be thus 
grounded in one and the same thing, and that the latter must exist necessar-
ily; for it is such a single necessary being that is to be identified with God. 
Kant must therefore exclude any alternative grounding of possibilities 
in a plurality of existing beings-some of the fundamental qualities being 
present as determinations in one of those beings, and others in others, but 
not all in anyone existing being. There are two cases to be considered in 
this alternative hypothesis. It might be supposed that all of the plurality of 
beings exist necessarily, and we will come to that case; but the most inter-
esting part of Kant's argument concerns the case in which some or all of 
them exist contingently. About this latter case Kant assumes that if one of 
those contingent beings failed to exist, the possibilities grounded in that 
being would also be lost; and he reasons as follows. 
For if one so conceives of internal possibility, then, that some can be 
annulled, yet in such a way that there still remains what is also given 
as thinkable through the other parts [of the plurality], then one must 
represent to oneself that it is possible in itself for internal possibility 
to be negated or annulled. But it is totally unthinkable and contradic-
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tory for something to be nothing, and this is as much as to say: to 
annul an inner possibility is to root out everything thinkable. 
The most important point about this reasoning is that Kant is arguing 
that whatever would annul allY possibility is impossible. Kant's usual for-
mula for necessary existence, as I have quoted it from both precritical and 
critical works, is that a thing's nonexistence is really, though not logically, 
necessary if its nonexistence would remove all possibility. There might seem 
to be an obvious advantage in relying only on this thesis rather than on the 
more sweeping premise that a thing's existence is necessary if its nonexis-
tence would remove allY possibility; but in truth I do not see how Kant's 
theistic argument can avoid the latter assumption, for reasons connected 
with the hypothesis to be refuted here, of possibilities grounded in a plurali-
ty of contingent beings. For your existence or mine would surely be enough 
to give a toehold in reality (though a precariously contingent one) to the 
possibility of those properties that we exemplify. So God's nonexistence 
would not take away all possibility unless it excluded the existence of 
beings like us; and while the dependence of finite existence on God is a the-
istic thesis, it is not a thesis to be assumed in a theistic argument like Kant's. 
So Kant must hold that nothing is possible that would remove any pos-
sibility. In terms familiar to modal logicians today, he must hold that 
whatever is possible is necessarily possible. And he did hold that. The jus-
tification that Kant offers for this thesis is not convincing. It is that "it is 
totally unthinkable and contradictory for something to be nothing, and this 
is as much as to say: to annul an inner possibility is to root out everything 
thinkable."" But it is neither unthinkable nor contradictory for something 
that would otherwise be something to be nothing, if by being something 
and being nothing we mean existing and not existing, respectively; and the 
claim that it is impossible where being something and being nothing are 
being possible and not being possible, respectively, is just the thesis that is 
to be proved: that what is possible is necessarily possible. It is not clear 
that Kant has a noncircular argument for this thesis, but perhaps he can get 
away without an argument for it, taking it as a starting point. It is not an 
altogether uncontroversial thesis, but it is widely accepted and sufficiently 
plausible that we will be lucky if our metaphysical arguments never have 
starting points shakier than that. 
This, however, does not complete the argument against the pluralistic 
alternative to theism for the ontological grounding of possibilities. So far 
as J can see, Kant has assumed without argument that if a possibility is 
grounded in a being that exists contingently, it is only contingently 
grounded and could fail to have a ground. This is plausible, but we might 
wonder how we know it is not a necessary truth that if one of the contin-
gent grounders were to fail to exist, its grounding role would be taken up 
by some other individually contingent being. 
More important, we have yet to deal with the alternative in which the 
plurality of grounding beings all exist necessarily, which would seem to 
provide enough assurance against the loss of any of the possibilities. Kant 
gives an argument that it is impossible for several things to be absolutely 
necessary, but I think it is not compatible with the argument we have just 
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examined against a plurality of contingent beings. Kant argues that if B is 
a necessary being, then its fundamental qualities are necessarily given in 
itself, and depend on no other ground for their possibility; but if A is also a 
necessary being, then "by virtue of the definition" B's possibility must 
depend on A. This last point might follow if a necessary being is by defini-
tion one whose nonexistence would entail the annulment of all possibility, 
but we have just seen that the argument against a plurality of contingent 
grounders requires the assumption that a thing's existence is necessary if 
its nonexistence would remove any possibility. The latter assumption is 
plausible too; but if it is correct, then A and B can both be necessary beings 
without grounding each other's possibility, so long as there is some possi-
bility grounded by each. 
For these reasons I think Kant's argument that all possibilities must be 
grounded in one and the same existing being is not a success. Leibniz 
seems to me to have done somewhat better on this point. Leibniz grounds 
his argument, more explicitly than Kant grounds his, in the general princi-
ple that every fact or truth must be grounded in things that exist. This 
applies quite emphatically to necessary as well as contingent truths. What 
the existing thing provides for the necessary truths is not exactly the reason 
why they are true rather than false, but is rather what we may call ontologi-
cal stallding, a foothold in reality. The possibility of the fundamental quali-
ties that Kant calls realities is central to the system of necessary truths for 
Leibniz, but it by no means exhausts the necessary facts that need ontologi-
cal grounding on his account. These fundamental possibilities give rise to 
indefinitely many necessary truths about their possible relations, modifica-
tions, and exemplifications; and each of those necessary truths requires an 
ontological grounding. 
It might be thought that as long as all the basic qualitative possibilities 
are ontologically grounded, that is enough grounding for the whole family 
of necessary truths arising from them, and therefore that if each of the basic 
possibilities is individually grounded in a different existing being, without 
anyone existing being in which all of them are grounded, that would 
ground the whole system; but that will not satisfy Leibniz. He argues as 
follows: 
The cause why the ... proposition [that a circle is larger in area than a 
square of the same perimeter] is true is not in the nature of the circle 
alone nor in the nature of the square alone, but also in other natures 
that enter into it-for instance, of the equal and of the perimeter. The 
proximate cause of one thing is single. And its cause must be in 
some [thing] [in aliqual. Therefore [it must bel in that in which the 
nature of the circle, the square, and the others is; that is, in the subject 
of ideas, or God." 
The indicated necessary truth about a relation between the circle and the 
square is single enough to require a single "proximate cause," according to 
Leibniz. That single cause, I take it, will be a relation between the natures 
of the circle and the square. That relation, Leibniz argues, must be ontolog-
ically grounded in some one existing thing, if the necessary truth is to have 
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the ontological grounding it needs; and because the relation depends on 
the natures of circle, square, equality, and perimeter, and so forth, it can be 
grounded only in something in which all those natures are represented so 
as to be grounded too. And since in general, as he notes, "a plurality of 
truths joined with each other produce new truths,"2!> any two natures or 
fundamental possibilities will jointly give rise to some necessary truth, 
which will require for its ontological grounding that both natures be repre-
sented and grounded in some one existing thing. Thus, taking all the inter-
relations into account, all the natures must be grounded in a single existing 
thing, which Leibniz identifies with God. 
The most debatable premise in this argument, I suppose, is that the nec-
essary truth about the circle and the square requires an ontological ground-
ing for the relation that is its "proximate cause," in addition to the ontologi-
cal grounding for the natures that constitute the terms of the relation. Why 
is it not enough for the relation to be implicit in the natures of its terms, 
even if they are represented only in different existing things, so that the 
relation itself is not represented in anything? I do not know of a knock-
down argument at this point, but T do find Leibniz's assumptions and 
argument plausible. They correspond to the intuition that when we follow 
out logical connections in our minds, we are riding on rails that have 
already been laid down somewhere in reality. 
It is time to take stock of Kant's precritical argument. It suffers from two 
deficiencies in comparison with Leibniz's argument. The first is that we 
have found in it no solid reason to suppose that in order to be onto logically 
grounded in God's existence the most fundamental possibilities must be 
exemplified and not just thought by God. The second is that, as I have just 
argued, Leibniz has more justification for the claim that all the possibilities 
must be grounded in some single existing being, which can be identified 
with God. Leibniz's justification for this crucial claim, moreover, is one 
that is not available to Kant. For it depends on the assumption that not 
only the most fundamental natures, but also all their interrelations and 
possible modifications, must be ontologically grounded, and concludes 
that they must have that grounding in God. But neither Leibniz nor Kant 
will grant that all those interrelations and modifications are exemplifed in 
God, though both will affirm that they are all thought by God. This speaks 
for Leibniz's metaphysical machinery of divine thought, as opposed to 
Kant's metaphysical machinery of divine exemplification. 
There are other points at which both Leibniz's and Kant's arguments 
could be questioned,27 but I will not pursue those questions here. Rather 
than trying here to establish a proof of the existence of God, I wish to 
employ the rest of this paper in exploring ways in which possibility may be 
grounded in God. For that purpose we need a reasonably well developed 
and plausible metaphysical account, but not necessarily a conclusive proof 
of divine existence. 
V. How the Precritical Kant May Haz'e Been Right After All 
Despite what I have just said about the superiority of Leibniz's argument 
for God's thinking all possibilities, by comparison with Kant's argument for 
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God's exemplifying all the most fundamental possibilities, I believe that 
Kant may have been right in holding that the ontological grounding of the 
material of possibility requires that at least the most fundamental qualita-
tive possibilities be exemplified in God. My reasons for thinking this begin 
with Leibniz's argument, and thus avoid the deficiencies that I have noted 
in Kant's own reasoning. It will be obvious that this stage of the argument 
is mine and not Kant's. In it I assume, as a starting point, that Leibniz is 
right in holding that the ontological grounding of possibilities depends on 
their all being thought by God. 
This means that all of them must be represented in the divine mind. But 
how are they represented? In particular, how are the most fundamental 
qualitative possibilities represented there? The prime example I have in 
mind as I consider this question is one that that Kant would not like-
namely, qualities of consciousness, such as phenomenal color or the felt 
quality of a pain-because I believe they are the clearest cases of occurrent, 
intrinsic qualities known to us. 
The nature of mental representation is a very large subject, on which 
whole books have been written, and are still being written. This is certain-
ly not the place to develop a complete theory of the subject. In a general 
way we can say that representation involves an appropriate relation 
between the representation and the content represented. Most attempts at 
an explanatory account of mental representation involve either a relation of 
resemblance or a causal relation, and I believe that a relation of one of these 
types must be involved in mental representation of fundamental qualities. 
This is not to propose that representation, or its intentionality, be reduced 
in these cases to resemblance or causation. The representation of possible 
qualities by a similar quality in my mind involves the thought that there 
could be other instances resembling this one that is now present in my con-
sciousness. That thought is something in my mind over and above the 
quality I have in my consciousness that is like what the other instances 
would be; and also T don't believe (though some do) that that thought is 
reducible to causal relations. 
It may still be the case, however, that mental representation of qualities 
requires resemblance or a causal relation even if it also requires something 
more. It may be that the representation requires a matter or content 
depending on resemblance or causal relation, as well as a representational 
form that has some other basis. In fact I believe that resemblance or causal 
relationship is required in some such way for mental representation of fun-
damental qualities. 
It should be emphasized that this is a claim about fundamental quali-
ties-by which I mean qualities whose role in the representation and 
grounding of possibilities is fundamental. If we have representations of an 
adequate stock of fundamental qualities, it may be possible to construct 
from them representations, and thus possibilities, of other qualities. I will 
not try to determine here just which qualities are fundamental in this way, 
but dearly some are and some are not. A contrasting pair of examples will 
suffice. Is every shade of phenomenal color fundamental? Or can some of 
them be constructed from others? I am not confident of any construction 
that would adequately give the content of a shade of phenomenal color 
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without its actually being present in anyone's consciousness; so God may 
need to be conscious of every possible shade of phenomenal color. (And 
why shouldn't an omniscient deity have that consciousness?) With regard 
to angularity, on the other hand, even phenomenal angularity, it seems that 
a being who has a conscious image of a single angle, and understands how 
the sides of an angle may in geometrical principle be rotated around the 
point of origin, has a concept of every possible size of angle, a concept that 
can ground the possibility of all possible sizes of angle. 
The conception of representations as images resembling what they rep-
resent is ancient and has never ceased to be influential. It is plausible to 
suppose that we typically represent structures by means of analogous 
structures of thought. Here we are concerned with the qualitative rather 
than the structural aspect of things, but it seems at least desirable to repre-
sent qualities too by some resembling image. Sometimes we represent 
qualities by physical images. The paint dealer represents colors of paint by 
samples that are supposed to resemble the painted surface in color. But 
God surely does not rely on anything like paint chips in conceiving of qual-
ities; and in any event physical images are contingent beings that cannot 
provide the kind of necessary grounding of possibilities that both Leibniz 
and Kant are after. So the resembling images that particularly concern us 
here will be mental images (and God's mental images, at that). If a quality is 
represented by a resembling mental image, the image will presumably be a 
quality of consciousness, a quality actually exemplified in some conscious-
ness, a quality actually belonging to that consciousness, or at least to a part 
or aspect of some state of it. The qualities represented in this way must 
therefore have some likeness to a quality of consciousness. 
This line of thought leads in philosophical theology from a representa-
tion thesis like Leibniz's to an exemplification thesis like Kant's. If God's 
representation of qualities is by resemblance, a version of the qualities 
must be present in God's thought, as qualities of some aspect of God's con-
sciousness (if that is not too anthropomorphic a way of putting it). But in 
that case a version of the qualities is actually exemplified in God's con-
sciousness. Representation of qualities by resemblance requires actual 
exemplification of enough "representative" members of families of resem-
bling qualities. 
Qualities are more satisfyingly represented by resemblance, I think, than 
in any other way. In the case of mental representation we are most apt to 
think we know "what [a quality] is like" when a resembling image of it is 
present to our minds. If you believe I have never felt anything like what 
you are feeling, you will probably think I cannot adequately understand 
the quality of your experience; I cannot know what it is like. 
Still we do represent qualities, even qualities of consciousness, of which 
we have never had any resembling image in our minds. A congenitally 
blind person, for example, can have a concept of color, and can even know a 
lot of facts about experiences of color. By studying the physiology and psy-
chology of perception a person who has never seen can know things about 
color perception that most sighted people probably do not know. How are 
particular phenomenal colors represented in the mind of a person who has 
never seen? How is the congenitally blind person's mental representation 
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of them connected with the qualities themselves as they occur in vision? 
The most plausible answer, I think, is that the representation in this case is 
connected with its object by a causal relation. It is doubtless a very complex 
causal relation, involving the participation of many people in various visual 
and linguistic events, interacting causally with each other and with visible 
objects. But without some causal chain, complex as it may be, leading from 
an actual experience of the color to the blind person's thought, there would 
be nothing to connect that thought with particular phenomenal colors. 
Insofar as we are concerned with qualities of consciousness, there is no 
clear need for a causal account of God's representing them, since they, or 
something sufficiently resembling them, can be exemplified in God's con-
sciousness. But we may still need a causal account of how God represents 
some other types of property, and constitutes their possibility. Powers and 
dispositions, for instance, can hardly be represented by resemblance by 
any occurrent quality of consciousness. But God's ideas of powers and dis-
positions presumably stand in a close enough causal or quasi-causal rela-
tion to God's own powers and dispositions to derive from them whatever 
content they need to represent powers and dispositions as such. 
For our argument the crucial point about this way of representing a 
property by virtue of a causal chain is that it presupposes that the property 
represented has actually been exemplified in some existing thing; for prop-
erties that are only possibly exemplified do not in the relevant way origi-
nate causal chains." So if God actually represents a property by virtue of a 
causal relation to it, the property must exist, actually, in something. And if 
God so represents the property necessarily, and it is not necessary that any-
thing exists outside of God, then the conclusion is near at hand that the 
property exists, necessarily, in God. 
An alternative way of grounding possibilities in causal properties of an 
actually existing being would not entail the actual exemplification of the 
possible properties, but I think there are serious objections to it. According 
to this alternative, all that is needed to ground the possibility of an occur-
rent property is a power to produce it, whether the occurrent property is 
actually instantiated or not. Some might claim that phenomenal blueness, 
for example, would have been possible even if no sentient being had ever 
experienced it, provided at least one actual being had the power to experi-
ence it under suitable stimulation. On this view, the postulation of an intu-
itively complete range of metaphysical possibilities will lead to an argu-
ment for an omnipotent being (or something close to it) rather than an 
argument for a conceptually omniscient being. 
Divine omnipotence can hardly provide the ontological grounding for 
possibilities in this way, however, if omnipotence is conceived as an all-
purpose power to produce anything metaphysically possible. For the 
scope of that absolutely general power depends on, and cannot determine, 
what is metaphysically possible. The content of metaphysical possibilities 
must come from somewhere else. One might try to solve the problem by 
thinking of divine omnipotence in a different way, as a bundle of specific 
powers to produce specific effects, so that the scope of omnipotence might 
define what is metaphysically possible; but is not obvious that this would 
yield an acceptable conception of omnipotence. 
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Even if it does, a more decisive problem remains. Any positive qualita-
tive content that powers have, connected with what they are powers to pro-
duce, they get from the qualities of the things or states resulting from them. 
There would therefore be a vicious circle in supposing that possibilities of 
qualities can derive their content from a power to produce them, even (I 
think) if the power is God's. Since this content is the main thing that needs 
to be grounded in an ontological grot.mding of a qualitative possibility, we 
cannot in the most fundamental cases find the ontological grounding of 
qualitative possibilities in powers to produce the qualities. Such a ground-
ing must already be given if the power is to have the relevant content; and I 
have suggested reasons for thinking it would have to be given by God's pos-
session of relevant archetypal qualities. 
T have not offered a conclusive proof of theological conclusions, but I 
have presented a rationale that has, I hope, some force to commend a way 
of seeing the possibility of qualities as ontologically grounded in similar or 
related qualities exemplified as well as represented in God, in line, at least 
broadly, with central theses of Kant's precritical argument.'9 
Yale University 
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